The risk of inter-state conflict has increased as a result of fresh deployments, with any armed conflict set to cause widespread disruption and risks to energy supply, as well as heightening the risk of a Ukrainian default, according to Matthew Clements, Deputy Head of Europe/CIS Analysis at IHS Country Risk.
Russia does not currently have the necessary heavy equipment (artillery, tanks etc) in the region to use it as a launch pad for an offensive into southern Ukraine. It would need time to bring in such assets by sea and ferry crossings.
The primary triggers for an escalation into armed conflict would be any violent action against ethnic Russians in Ukraine, or action by Ukrainian military forces or nationalist militias against the Russian forces deployed to the Crimea region.
Russia does not currently have the necessary heavy equipment (artillery, tanks etc) in the region to use it as a launch pad for an offensive into southern Ukraine – it would need time to bring in such assets by sea and ferry crossings. As such, if Ukraine launched a military offensive against the peninsula, the Russian troops’ main role would be to slow this down; this would be made easier by the narrow land crossings into the region and the likely naval and air support they would receive from the Black Sea Fleet and Russian mainland, respectively. Although a full Ukrainian offensive along these lines could eventually be successful, Moscow would hope its forces could buy enough time and occupy enough Ukrainian forces to allow it to launch its own offensive in the east, which the Ukrainian military would struggle to resist.
Under an inter-state and civil war scenario, disruption to land and air transport would be extensive. In the initial phases of an escalation, airports in eastern Ukraine, particularly those with dual military-civilian use, would probably come under attempted blockade by Russian troops or local pro-Russian militias. Crimea is also dependent on the rest of Ukraine for its electricity and water supply, and cut-offs could be expected to form part of a conflict scenario.
The current circumstances carry a high risk of escalation, given the entrenched positions of both sides and lack of room for diplomatic manoeuvre. In Crimea, there are sufficient Russian troops in place to ensure that the region is de facto under Russian control. Over the weekend, there was also an attempt by a Russian special operations detachment to seize weapons from the 191st Training Squadron of the Ukrainian navy in Sevastopol, which was prevented by Ukrainian naval officers. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian interim government has had no option but to put its troops on mobilisation alert, given what it perceives to be an armed incursion on Ukrainian territory, and it is unlikely to back down from this position.
Russia has made it very clear that it believes it is defending its legitimate interests and protecting Russian citizens in Crimea. Crucially, in a lengthy telephone conversation with US president Barack Obama on 1 March, Putin cautioned that “in the case of any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine… Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population”, accords to Putin’s office. This fits with IHS’s view that any escalation would probably involve Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine, beyond Crimea. This in turn would create conditions conducive to civil war, as pro-Russian communities in eastern Ukraine would seek Russia’s protection, and parts of the Ukrainian army would probably defect to the Russian side.