While the current offensive in northern Iraq has been spearheaded by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Mosul, the ability to overrun multiple villages simultaneously is very likely to be facilitated by support from an assortment of smaller jihadist, Baathist, and tribal groups, according to Meda Al Rowas, senior analyst, IHS Country Risk.
For its part, despite a more extreme jihadist ideology, ISIL has demonstrated that it has the capacity to co-operate with Iraqi tribal factions in al-Anbar by accepting joint control of Fallujah since January 2014.
ISIL’s co-operation with groups like JRTN will probably sustain support for armed resistance against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated government.
The General Military Revolutionary Council of Iraq (GMRCI), a front for the Baathist group Jaish Rijaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandiyya (JRTN), has released video footage and status updates on the insurgents’ advance from Mosul towards Baghdad on 11 and 12 June.
While the current offensive in northern Iraq has been spearheaded by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Mosul, the ability to overrun multiple villages simultaneously is very likely to be facilitated by support from an assortment of smaller jihadist, Baathist, and tribal groups.
Support from JRTN is the most notable, where its presence in Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salaheddine provinces has been well-established through video footage, as well as pictures by the tribal defence councils in 2013 and the GMRCI since January 2014. Rather than taking an overtly Baathist stance, JRTN has been opting to portray its activity within the context of a Sunni tribal uprising. Although there is limited support for JRTN’s Baathist nationalist rhetoric within the broader Sunni community in Iraq, it has succeeded in gaining support by presenting armed resistance within the context of a Sunni uprising against Shia forces backed by a sectarian government.
For its part, despite a more extreme jihadist ideology, ISIL has demonstrated that it has the capacity to co-operate with Iraqi tribal factions in al-Anbar by accepting joint control of Fallujah since January 2014. Anecdotal evidence suggests it also recruited tribal help in taking over the city of Hawija on 11 June, where tribes opted as early as April 2013 to engage in armed resistance.
ISIL’s co-operation with groups like JRTN will probably sustain support for armed resistance against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated government among the Sunni, provided that it avoids mass Sunni casualties during operations in areas under its control such as Fallujah and Mosul. In turn, the Iraqi government will rely heavily on recruiting Shia militiamen to populate Maliki’s volunteer army, expanding the Sunni-Shia divide even further, therefore raising the risk of a gradual slide towards civil war. This dynamic is likely to hold so long as the JRTN and ISIL avoid entering into open and protracted conflict.