ISIL’s new offensive comes in the wake of the Iraqi Army’s efforts to dislodge the group from the western province of Anbar, which has stretched the security forces’ resources and capabilities, according to Raad Alkadiri, Senior Director, Upstream Research, IHS Energy.
Nevertheless, the speed of Ninawah’s fall, and the determined move by ISIL south along the Tigris river valley illustrates the potency of the insurgent group and the extent to which the civil war in Syria has spilled over into Iraq. It is also testament to the degree to which Iraq’s ongoing political disputes, and the consequent sense of alienation and frustration that the Sunni population feels, has created a fertile ground for extremists. Iraq’s mainstream Sunni political leaders are divided, opportunistic and impotent, and incapable of protecting the interests of their constituency in a political environment characterized increasingly by sectarian and ethnic agendas.
Moreover, these leaders have been reluctant to support government efforts to confront extremists. As a result, large parts of the Sunni population are now increasingly tolerant, if not outright supportive, of ISIL and other extremist groups.
The immediate reaction of Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish leaders suggests that the ISIL advance is unlikely to alter their narrow parochialism. The former have sought to lay the blame for ISIL’s success firmly at the door of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as a means of weakening his claim to a third term; Kurdish leaders are using the security crisis to extend their political control directly into disputed territories, under the guise of providing protection for Kurdish communities outside of Kurdistan’s current borders. Thus, rather than rallying Iraq’s political elite to a common purpose, it is exposing their divisions even further. This will limit the effectiveness of the government’s response and in the longer-term poses an increased threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity.
In the meantime, oil and gas infrastructure in ISIL-controlled areas – including the northern crude export route and its downstream assets – will be vulnerable to repeated attack, and the risk of disruptions to domestic product supply is high. ISIL will also pose a continued threat to operations in some Kurdish-awarded blocks that lie in disputed territories. The risk to operations will rise further if ISIL’s operations prompt external intervention, possibly by Turkey or Iran, which will exacerbate internal tensions even further. However, southern production and exports are unlikely to be directly affected.