Russia’s overarching strategy in Ukraine is to prevent the country joining Western structures such as the European Union and NATO, by keeping the country unbalanced and destabilised, both economically and politically, according to Matthew Clements, Deputy Head of Europe & CIS Analysis, IHS Country Risk.
“This fulfils the goal of maintaining a ‘buffer zone’ between Russia and NATO member states, and preventing Ukraine from being able to launch any form of military operation to re-take Crimea. The hard line taken against Ukraine, combined with domestic media output that continues to demonise the government in Kiev and the West, also boosts President Vladimir Putin’s popularity and reinforces his nationalist credentials, reducing the risk of popular unrest in Russia.
“Moscow’s key operational aim is to prevent the separatists from being defeated, and in order to do so it has very likely been supplying large quantities of military equipment and allowing ‘volunteers’ to cross the border. By ensuring the continuation of the insurgency, Russia is aiming to put pressure on the Ukrainian economy and prevent effective political leadership, in the hope that if the country falls into a deep recession and casualties from the fighting reach high levels, the government would face growing popular unrest and protests. The initial deployment of approximately 40,000 Russian troops to the border region in April can also been seen in this context, and was likely intended to force Kiev to mobilise its own forces at great cost, rather than for any intended military action. On 22 July, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko announced the mobilisation of further military forces to “fill the manpower shortage”.
The ongoing security operation in eastern Ukraine has already had an impact on the country’s economy, with the National Statistics Office reporting on 30 July that the economy had contracted 4.7% in the second quarter compared to the same period in 2013. The fighting in the industrial heartland of the country, which previously contributed 16% of the country’s GDP, is a major factor in this fall, as is the cost of the security operation itself.
“Any Ukrainian move to isolate the rebels, cut them off from their supply lines, and threaten victory is likely to take months rather than weeks. In that event, Russia will face a crucial decision on whether to significantly increase its military aid to the separatists, and possibly directly intervene to prevent their defeat, or allow a Ukrainian government victory and a likely loss of influence in the country.”